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Abstract
This paper investigates the heterogeneous impact of monetary policy shocks on financial in-
termediaries. I distinguish between banks and shadow banks based on their funding constraints.
Because credit creation by banks responds to economy-wide productivity endogenously, bank
reaction to shocks corresponds to the balance sheet channel. Shadow banks are constrained
by their available funding and their behavior is better explained by the lending channel. In
line with empirical observations, shadow bank lending moves in the opposite direction to bank
lending following monetary policy shocks, which mitigates aggregate credit responses. The
propagation of real and financial shocks is likewise altered when shadow banks are identified
as a distinct sector among financial intermediaries. Following estimation of the model using
Bayesian methods, a historical shock decomposition highlights the roles of banks and shadow
banks in the run-up to the 2007 - 08 financial crisis.
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1 Introduction
Loan issuance is traditionally understood as one of the core functions of the banking sector. How-
ever, the data show that the volume of financial intermediation via non-bank financial institutions
(NBFI), i.e. the market based or shadow banking sector, has been rising in the last decades, even
overtaking the traditional banking sector in several countries, see FSB (2014) [9]. Reacting to this
development, Woodford (2010) [29] calls for ”a framework for macroeconomic analysis in which
intermediation plays a crucial role and [...] which also takes account of the fact that the U.S.
financial sector is now largely market-based.” Although the financial sector has been incorporated
in recent models, it is still largely treated as a relatively homogeneous entity. However, empirical
studies indicate that banks and shadow banks react to shocks in different ways.1 Consider mone-
tary policy: While banks reduce the amount of loans on their balance sheets following monetary
policy tightening, shadow banks increase lending (Figure 1). This suggests that the share of credit
intermediation via the shadow banking sector is an important determinant of the effectiveness of
monetary policy on aggregate lending and the economy.
Figure 1: Impact of a 100bp increase in the monetary policy rate on bank and shadow bank lending
(Source: Nelson, Pinter, Theodoridis, 2015)
In this paper I will answer the following questions: How does the monetary transmission channel
via shadow banks work and how can it be modeled? How does the resulting credit intermediation
of shadow banks affect the reaction of aggregate loan supply to monetary policy? In addition, if
the inclusion of shadow banks changes the propagation of shocks, what has been its contribution
to macroeconomic fluctuations in recent years?
To answer these questions I develop a structural model that distinguishes between banks and
shadow banks based on their ability to create credit. I use the monetary DSGE model with financial
intermediaries by Gertler and Karadi (2011) [10] (GK11 from here on) to describe bank behavior
and credit creation, and I extend it with a shadow banking sector. In this model, banks create
credit endogeneously in the sense of ”inside money” as in Kiyotaki and Moore (2004) [18]. Shadow
banks need to raise funds from households to satisfy firm loan demand. I model fund raising by
shadow banks as a search in the funding market for previously created deposits, which are held by
the household sector. Following Wasmer and Weil (2004) [28], I model funding market frictions
analogously to those on the labor market because of their comparable characteristics of ”moral
hazard, heterogeneity and specificity”. After establishing a funding match, shadow banks have
the ability to issue short-term debt (Sunderam, forthcoming [25]; OFR, 2013 [22]), i.e. repurchase
agreements (repo).
In GK11, an increase in the monetary policy rate leads to an increase in the external finance
1See Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2009) [1]; Den Haan and Sterk (2010) [13]; Igan et al. (2013) [15];
Nelson, Pinter and Theodoridis (2015) [21].
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premium for borrowers, prompting a decrease in the value of their collateral, thereby decreasing
the willingness of banks to lend. The resulting deleveraging results in a credit squeeze for the
real sector, disinvestment and a fall in output. Simultaneously, increased deposit rates discourage
households from current consumption and instead encourage savings. In this paper, savings in the
form of deposit holdings constitute available funds for the shadow banking sector. After an increase
in the monetary policy rate, this increase in available funds for shadow banks results in a higher
share of savings flowing into the shadow banking sector. Shadow banks lend out these additional
funds and thereby alleviate the credit squeeze, mitigating the fall in investments and any consequent
recession.
Shadow bank credit is constrained by the supply of available funding and their reaction is accu-
rately explained by the lending channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995 [4]). Banks are less constrained
by the supply of loanable funds than shadow banks since they can create credit endogenously. Their
reaction to monetary policy therefore corresponds more closely to the balance sheet channel (Disy-
atat (2011) [8]). By incorporating the quantitatively important shadow banking sector I am able to
assess the effects of the lending channel for shadow banks compared to the balance sheet channel
for banks. Since the non-bank financial sectors have a different size in different jurisdictions, this
model extension can help to better assess the impact of monetary policy shocks on aggregate lend-
ing and the economy, depending on the share of shadow banks in aggregate lending. In addition,
the present paper lays out a simple way to extend financial models by adding a shadow banking
sector, or alternatively, the recognition of a lending channel.
Existing macroeconomic models of shadow banking include Meeks, Nelson and Alessandri (2014)
[20]; Verona, Martins and Drumont (2013) [27]; and Goodhart et al. (2012) [12]. The first is
mainly concerned with financial stability and considers shadow banks as off balance sheet vehicles
of commercial banks to unload risky loans. Verona et al. study adverse effects of excessively
easy monetary policy and understand shadow banks as financial intermediaries specializing in less
risky loans akin to bond issuance by investment banks. Goodhart et al. study different regulatory
regimes to stop fire sales by shadow banks and take the opposite view to Verona et al., considering
shadow banks to be less risk averse, but still funded by the regular banking sector, comparable to
off balance sheet vehicles as in Meeks et al.
Search and matching in credit markets has been studied since Dell’Arricia and Garibaldi (1998)
[6]. Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2003) [7] analyze the business cycle effects of long-term lending
relationships with frictions. Wasmer and Weil (2004) [28] study the effects of credit market frictions
on labor market dynamics. What these models have in common is that the total amount of credit
to be allocated is either fixed exogenously or is influenced endogenously but without any relation
to credit creation by banks. This paper explicitly focuses on this interaction.
In the next section, I will describe the basic model with a simple shadow bank extension and
further consider how endogenous credit (repo) creation by shadow banks can be incorporated into
the analysis. Section 3 contains the model analysis, including Bayesian estimation of newly in-
troduced structural parameters and all shock parameters, impulse response functions to monetary
policy shocks and a historical shock decomposition. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
This section lays out the basic model. It is the monetary DSGE model with financial intermediaries
by GK11. I add a second financial intermediation sector, called the non-bank financial or shadow
banking sector, that issues loans to firms. Shadow banks first need to raise funds from households
3
in the form of deposits to engage in firm lending. Irrespective of whether shadow banks lend to the
real sector directly, or whether they buy securitized credit claims of previously originated loans,
shadow banks become the effective intermediary, and banks’ balance sheets are freed up.
In this model the economy is populated by six types of agents: households, banks, shadow
banks, non-financial goods producers that demand loans, capital producers, and monopolistically
competitive retailers. A central bank conducting monetary policy is the source of monetary dis-
turbances and completes the model. The setup is equivalent to GK11 with the addition of shadow
banks and an additional household savings technology.
2.1 Households
A continuum of households of measure one exists with each household constituting a family sepa-
rated into a share 1 − f of ”workers” and a share f of ”bankers”. Bankers manage the financial
intermediaries called banks, accumulate profits over several periods, and eventually redistribute
them back to the households. Workers consume, save and supply labor. They maximize discounted
lifetime utility2
max
Ct,Bt+1,Lt
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi[ln(Ct+i − hCt+i−1)− χ
HH
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt+i ]
subject to the sequence of period budget constraints
Ct +Bt+1 + Tt = WtLt + Πt +R
w
t Bt.
Each unit of labor Lt earns the real wage Wt. Bt are savings in the form of government bonds,
deposits held at banks, or fund shares with shadow banks. Government bonds and deposits are
both riskless and are treated as substitutes. Savings pay the weighted interest rate Rwt based on
the allocation of deposits in banks and fund shares in shadow banks. Πt are profits from ownership
of capital producers, retailers and financial intermediaries, both banks and shadow banks. β is the
discount factor, h is the habit parameter, χHH is the relative utility weight of labor and ϕ is the
inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
With %t denoting marginal utility of consumption, the first order conditions for consumption
and labor are given by, respectively,
%t = (Ct − hCt−1)−1 − βhEt(Ct+1 − hCt)−1 (1)
%tWt = χ
HHLϕt (2)
with the Euler condition and marginal rate of substitution between consumption today and tomor-
row given by, respectively,
EtβΛt,t+1R
w
t+1 = 1 (3)
Λt,t+1 =
%t+1
%t
. (4)
2For simplicity, I will abstract from equations of the individual agents and instead show their aggregate form
directly, distinguishing between individual and aggregate forms as necessary. For more detail, GK11 show individual
agents’ equations.
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2.2 Banks
Banks’ balance sheets are given by
QtSt = Dt+1 +Nt. (5)
Banks fund their loan portfolio St priced at Qt through their net worth Nt and deposits obtained
from households Dt+1 other than their family members. Because they pay interest on deposits of
Rt+1 and earn a return Rkt+1 on their loans, an individual bank’s net worth evolves according to
Nt+1 = Rkt+1QtSt −Rt+1Dt+1
= (Rkt+1 −Rt+1)QtSt +Rt+1Nt.
Banks want to maximize their expected terminal net wealth before they exit the industry with
a probability θ per period and pay out all the accumulated profits to their respective households.
Expected terminal net wealth is given by
Vt = Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iNt+1+i
= νtQtSt + ηtNt
where the second line is the equivalent recursive formulation. The marginal expected discounted
value of net worth is ηt and νt is the marginal expected discounted value of expanding assets
νt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1(Rkt+1 −Rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θxt,t+1νt+1] (6)
ηt = Et[(1− θ) + βΛt,t+1zt,t+1θηt+1] (7)
and the growth rate in net worth zt,t+1 and the growth rate in assets is xt,t+1 defined below.
It is profitable to increase the loan portfolio as long as the interest rate differential is positive.
To motivate an endogenous constraint on banks’ ability to obtain funds, an agency problem as
in GK11 and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) [11] is introduced: every period a banker can divert a
fraction of the loan portfolio λt that the depositors at the bank are not able to recover. As a
consequence, the bank goes bankrupt. Therefore, households will keep their deposits at individual
banks only as long as the franchise value of the bank, Vt, is higher than or equal to the divertible
amount, which guarantees the banker’s interest in not stealing from the bank:
Vt ≥ λtQtSt.
The divertible fraction λt is a time dependent AR(1) process with persistence ρλ, which is
included to analyze the role of trust in banks and a corresponding ability to lever up. I will assume
that the constraint always binds, and after substituting and rearranging, the size of a banker’s loan
portfolio then depends on the size of their net wealth according to
QtSt =
ηt
λt − νtNt (8)
and the leverage ratio can be defined as
φt ≡ ηt
λt − νt . (9)
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The growth rate in net worth zt,t+1 and the growth rate in assets xt,t+1 are defined as
zt,t+1 =
Nt+1
Nt
=
(Rkt+1 −Rt+1)QtSt +Rt+1Nt
Nt
= (Rkt+1 −Rt+1)φt +Rt+1 (10)
xt,t+1 =
Qt+1St+1
QtSt
=
φt+1Nt+1
φtNt
=
φt+1
φt
zt,t+1. (11)
Since a constant share 1− θ of bankers dies every period and distributes its retained earnings to
their households, f(1− θ) workers become new bankers. They receive the same start-up net worth
Nnt as in GK11. Net worth of existing banks Net and new banks Nnt make up aggregate net worth
Nt according to
Nt = Net +Nnt (12)
Net = θ[(Rkt −Rt)φt−1 +Rt]Nt−1 (13)
Nnt = ωQtSt−1. (14)
Note that existing net worth is predetermined. The only way banks can react to changing
loan demand within the period is via the adjustment of the leverage ratio, as well as via the
change of capital prices Qt in the start-up net worth Nnt. The leverage ratio reacts to a change in
economy-wide productivity endogenously, as can be seen by its dependence on the borrowing rate
and monetary policy rate in equation 6.
2.3 Shadow Banks
Shadow banks cannot create credit, but instead sell fund shares, FSt, to households
3. The amount
of loans SSBt that shadow banks can issue to the goods producers is therefore given by their balance
sheet constraint:
QtS
SB
t = FSt. (15)
The shadow bank is a simple intermediary with no liquidity transformation on its balance sheet
in line with the loanable funds model. To raise funds from households, shadow banks spend vt in
advertisements for their fund shares FSt, which have a probability qt of being successfully matched
with a deposit. The idea behind this is to model investor-fund heterogeneity implicitly as in Wasmer
and Weil (2004) [28]. Shadow banks need to advertise their operations, which is costly. However,
not every advertisement speaks to every household. Households may disagree with investment
conditions, the targeted borrower base or the fund manager. Therefore every advertisement only
has a certain probability of being matched with a given deposit by a household and stays unmatched
otherwise.
3I will introduce deposit-like credit claims of shadow banks in Section 2.8.
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Accordingly, shadow banks maximize their discounted future profits by choosing fund advertise-
ments and loan issuance SSBt :
max
vt,SSBt
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiΛt,t+iΠ
SB
t+i
with shadow bank profits
ΠSBt = (Rkt −RSBt )Qt−1SSBt−1 − vt.
Shadow bank profits are made up of the interest rate differential times the volume of funds
they intermediate net of advertising expenses. The interest rates they pay on fund shares, RSBt , is
negotiated further below.
Once a shadow bank has exchanged fund shares for deposits with households, the match will
stay put until the household withdraws the initial bank deposit. As is common with separation
of firm-worker matches in the search and matching literature, I do not model fund redemption
explicitly, but instead assume a constant probability of separation χSB , which results in a law of
motion for fund shares: Shadow banks’ period t sources of funding consist of the fund shares that
have not been redeemed plus the new matches from fund advertisement given by
FSt = (1− χSB)FSt−1 + qtvt. (16)
The first order conditions for posting fund unit advertisements and loan issuance are, respec-
tively,
%˜t =
1
qt
,
%˜tQt = βΛt,t+1
{
(Rkt+1 −RSBt+1)Qt + %˜t+1(1− χSB)Qt
}
with %˜t the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint (16). Combining these equations results in the
Euler condition for fund advertisements:
1
qt
= EtβΛt,t+1
{
(Rkt+1 −RSBt+1) + (1− χSB)
1
qt+1
}
. (17)
New advertisements will be posted until the marginal cost of matching an additional fund unit
equals the marginal benefit of having matched an additional fund unit, which is the combination of
the interest rate differential and avoided future search costs by having established a match in the
previous period.
2.3.1 Matching
Individual savers and individual shadow banks searching for funds randomly meet and evaluate the
potential for a match in isolation. In the aggregate, this behavior is approximated via a matching
technology. To compute the probability of matching a shadow bank looking for funds with a
household I assume a funding market matching function m(vt, Dt+1 − FSt) that is increasing in
its arguments, the number of fund unit advertisements vt and the number of ’unemployed’ funds
Dt+1 − FSt. If a unit of deposits has been exchanged for a fund share, it is not available for the
remaining searching shadow banks any longer and hence ’employed’. I define unemployed funds as
Dut+1 ≡ Dt+1 − FSt. (18)
7
Assuming a constant returns to scale matching function, the probability that a shadow bank
will find suitable funding is then
q(θt) = m(1, θ
−1
t ) =
m(vt, D
u
t+1)
vt
= sθ−ξt (19)
with matching elasticity ξ, matching efficiency s, and funding market tightness θt given by
θt ≡ vt
Dut+1
. (20)
2.3.2 Interest Rate Bargaining
Because of the existence of search frictions, shadow banks enjoy a rent on established matches. I
assume that the interest rates shadow banks pay on funds raised is determined via Nash bargaining
over these surpluses. ωHH signifies the relative bargaining power of households. Interest rates RSBt+1
are negotiated that maximize a convex combination of the surpluses,
RSBt+1 = argmax ω
HH lnV HHt + (1− ωHH)lnV SBt .
The resulting interest rate that shadow banks pay for funds raised is (see Appendix A.1 for
details)
RSBt+1 = (1− ωHH)Rt+1 + ωHH {Rkt+1 + θt+1} . (21)
If household bargaining power is low, shadow banks can get away with paying only the interest
rate Rt+1 that banks pay on their deposits. With increasing bargaining power, shadow banks need
to share expected profits with investing households.
The interest rate that households receive on their savings is the weighted average of interests
payments from holdings of deposits and holdings of fund shares
Rwt = Rt
Dt
Bt
+RSBt
FSt−1
Bt
. (22)
2.4 Goods Producers
Perfectly competitive goods producers manufacture intermediate goods and sell them to the retailer
at the relative intermediate output price Pmt. Goods producers need to finance their capital expen-
ditures via loans from intermediaries, which they may borrow without frictions, i.e. intermediaries
can enforce all of their claims. However, since banks are constrained in the amount of deposits
they can issue and shadow banks are constrained in the amount of funds they can raise, lending by
intermediaries is capital constrained, which affects the supply of funds to firms and therefore the
required interest rate for borrowing, Rkt+1. Except for the addition of another source of funding,
capital producers are identical to those in GK11.
The firm maximizes its profits by choosing capital Kt+1 and labor Lt optimally each period.
max
Kt+1,Lt
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiΛt,t+1 [PmtYt + (Qt − δ)ξtKt −WtLt −RktKtQt−1]
with production output given by
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Yt = At(ξtKt)
αL1−αt (23)
where α is the capital share, Qt is the real price of capital, δ is the depreciation rate and Wt are
wages.
The first-order conditions are
Rkt+1Qt = Pmt+1α
Yt+1
Kt+1
+ (Qt+1 − δ) (24)
Pmt(1− α)Yt
Lt
= Wt. (25)
Firms do not earn any profits and pay out ex post returns to capital as interest payments,
resulting in no profits state by state. They pay out all their profits to their creditors, who are a
combination of banks and shadow banks according to
Kt+1 = St + S
SB
t . (26)
2.5 Capital Producers
Following GK11, capital producers buy leftover capital from goods producers which they refurbish,
for which the price is unity. Units of new capital are made using input of final output and are then
sold to goods producers at Qt, which capital producers set by solving
max
Int
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tΛt,τ
{
(Qτ − 1)Inτ − f
(
Inτ + ISS
Inτ−1 + ISS
)
(Inτ + ISS)
}
with
Int ≡ Itµt − δξtKt.
Following the literature on the importance of marginal efficiency of investment (Justiniano,
Primiceri, Tambalotti, 2010) [17], investment specific shocks µt affect the transformation of gross
investment into net investment. The functional form of f(.) obeys f(1) = f ′(1) = 0 and f ′′(1) > 0.
f(.) determines capital adjustment costs with the steady state value for investments given by ISS .
The capital producer thus creates profits outside of the steady state. Households receive profits
from sales of new capital at price Qt, which is given by the first-order condition
Qt = 1 + f(.) +
Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
f ′(.)− EtβΛt,t+1
(
Int+1 + ISS
Int + ISS
)2
f ′(.). (27)
2.6 Retailers
Retailers buy intermediate goods from goods producers at the relative intermediate output price
Pmt. Final output is the CES composite of a continuum of output by each retailer f with the
elasticity of substitution , given by
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
−1

ft df
] 
−1
.
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Because users of final output minimize costs, we get
Yft =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−
Yt
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−ft df
] 1
1−
.
Each retailer can reset prices with probability 1− γ each period. Retailers will otherwise index
their prices to lagged inflation. The retailers then choose their reset price P ∗t optimally to solve
max
P∗t
Et
∞∑
i=0
γiβiΛt,t+1
[
P ∗t
Pt+i
i∏
k=1
(1 + pit+k−1)γp − Pmt+i
]
Yft+i.
The first-order condition is given by
Et
∞∑
i=0
γiβiΛt,t+1
[
P ∗t
Pt+i
i∏
k=1
(1 + pit+k−1)γp − 
− 1Pmt+i
]
Yft+i = 0.
The evolution of the price level is given by
Pt = [(1− γ)(P ∗t )1− + γ(Πγpt−1Pt−1)1−]1/(1−). (28)
2.7 Resources and Policy
The aggregate resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct + vt + It + f
(
Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
)
(Int + ISS) +Gt, (29)
capital evolves according to
Kt+1 = ξtKt + Int (30)
and stochastic government expenditures are financed via lump sum taxes
Gt = Tt. (31)
Monetary policy is characterized by a Taylor rule. The nominal interest rate is given by it,
with a steady state interest rate of iSS , the natural rate of output given by Y
∗
t , an interest rate
smoothing parameter ρ, the inflation coefficient κpi and the output gap coefficient κy:
it = (1− ρ) [iSS + κpipit + κy(logYt − logY ∗t )] + ρit−1 + t. (32)
The exogeneous shock to monetary policy enters the nominal interest rate as t. The nominal
interest rate has an effect on the economy through the Fisher relation
1 + it = Rt+1Et(1 + pit+1). (33)
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2.8 Extension: Repo creation by Shadow Banks
Some shadow banks can issue repo, BSBt+1, just like banks issue deposits. Not every agent in the
economy accepts these credit claims as payment. Only deposits are accepted by everyone4. There-
fore, shadow banks have to always have deposits available, which they raise on the funding markets
from households. Their credit claim issuance depends on the amount of funds raised. Shadow
banks’ balance sheets are now given by
QtS
SB
t = B
SB
t+1 + FSt. (34)
Shadow banks can now fund their loan portfolio SSBt priced at Qt through raising funds FSt
and through issuing credit claims BSBt+1. Shadow banks have a fiduciary duty with respect to the
fund shares that they manage. They will therefore maximize their net wealth. Since the interest
rate on credit claims is determined in the period in which they are issued, it is not risky and equal
to the interest rate paid on deposits, Rt+1. Shadow banks’ net worth then evolves according to
FSt+1 = Rkt+1QtS
SB
t −Rt+1BSBt+1
= (Rkt+1 −Rt+1)QtSSBt +Rt+1FSt.
The net wealth of a shadow bank evolves until its fund shares are redeemed for deposits as
V SBt = Et
∞∑
i=0
χSB(1− χSB)iβi+1Λt,t+1+iFSt+1+i
= νSBt QtS
SB
t + η
SB
t FSt
with ηSBt being the marginal expected discounted value of fund shares and ν
SB
t being the marginal
expected discounted value of expanding assets
νSBt = Et[χ
SBβΛt,t+1(Rkt+1 −Rt+1) + βΛt,t+1(1− χSB)xSBt,t+1νSBt+1] (35)
ηSBt = Et[χ
SB + βΛt,t+1z
SB
t,t+1(1− χSB)ηSBt+1] (36)
and the growth rate in shadow bank assets zSBt,t+1 and the growth rate in shadow bank net worth
4See Hicks’ (1989 [14]) explanation of different acceptabilities of money in the context of the market for bills of
exchange (Chapter 6), and Pozsar (2014) [24] who writes that ”banks and demand deposits are special [...] because
of their unique role in forming the backbone of the payments system and facilitating the payments of all entities
lower in the system-hierarchy.”
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xSBt,t+1, respectively,
zSBt,t+1 =
FSt+1
FSt
=
(Rkt+1 −Rt+1)QtSSBt +Rt+1FSt
FSt
= (Rkt+1 −Rt+1)φSBt +Rt+1 (37)
xSBt,t+1 =
Qt+1S
SB
t+1
QtSSBt
=
φSBt+1FSt+1
φSBt FSt
=
φSBt+1
φSBt
zSBt,t+1. (38)
I now introduce the same incentive constraint for shadow banks as GK11 and Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) assume for banks: every period a shadow banker can divert a fraction of the loan
portfolio λSBt that the holders of credit claims on the shadow bank would not be able to recover. As
a consequence, the shadow bank would go bankrupt. As is the case for banks, the divertible share
is a stochastic process to shed light on the role of trust in shadow banks, and the resulting ability
to leverage. Households will hold credit claims on shadow banks only as long as the franchise value
of the shadow bank is higher than or equal to the divertible amount,
V SBt ≥ λSBt QtSSBt .
When the incentive constraint binds, the size of a shadow banker’s loan portfolio depends on
the size of their net wealth according to
QtS
SB
t =
ηSBt
λSBt − νSBt
FSSBt (39)
and the leverage ratio can be defined as
φSBt =
ηSBt
λSBt − νSBt
. (40)
Since one additional unit of fund shares now leads to more than one additional unit of loans
to the real economy, equation (15) is modified to equation (39). The Euler condition for fund
advertisements changes accordingly:
1
qt
= EtβΛt,t+1
{
Rkt+1φ
SB
t −RSBt+1 − (φSBt − 1)Rt+1 +
1− χSB
qt+1
}
. (41)
The increased profit opportunity through credit claim issuance is also reflected in the bargained
interest rate:
RSBt+1 = Rt+1 + ω
HH
[
φSBt (Rkt+1 −Rt+1) + θt+1
]
. (42)
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Households’ savings now consist of deposits held at banks, fund shares at shadow banks, and
credit claims of shadow banks. The resulting weighted interest rate they earn is
Rwt = Rt
Bt
Bt + FSt +BSBt
+RSBt
FSt
Bt + FSt +BSBt
+Rt
BSBt
Bt + FSt +BSBt
. (43)
3 Model Analysis
In this section, I will first pin down the model parameterization using calibration and Bayesian
estimation. Next, I analyze how monetary policy shocks propagate through the economy, both
with and without shadow banks5. I then conduct a historical shock decomposition. The differing
reactions of both channels are explained and their practical relevance is examined thereafter. The
model is solved via first order perturbation around the deterministic steady state.
3.1 Parameterization
Most of the structural parameters are fixed and taken from GK11. The new parameters that follow
the introduction of the shadow banking sector in Section 2.3 are the separation rate χSB , household
bargaining power ωHH , matching efficiency s and matching elasticity ξ. A new parameter from the
shadow banks’ ability to create repo in Section 2.8 is the mean value of λSBt , the fraction of its loan
portfolio a shadow banker may divert each period. Table 1 shows the fixed structural parameter
values and their source.
All parameters describing the shock processes and structural parameters describing shadow
banks are estimated using Bayesian methods. Banks are defined as US-chartered depository in-
stitutions and credit unions. Shadow banks combine Finance Companies, Funding Corporations,
Asset-backed Security Issuers and Money Market Mutual Funds. The macroeconomic time series
underlying the data for observables are real GDP, real investment, real government expenditures
and the GDP price deflator (all from the Bureau of Economic Analysis). Data on banks and shadow
banks are taken from the Flows of Funds. For both sectors, we include time series on financial assets
as well as the amount of fixed income liabilities. Since the model is expressed in log-deviations from
steady state for estimation purposes, I take the log difference from the HP filtered trend (smoothing
parameter is set to 1600). The data have a quarterly frequency and range from 1985:Q1 to 2008:Q4.
Although earlier data are available, the shadow banking sector was a much smaller component of
aggregate credit before 1985. I drop data after 2008 because the financial crisis and its aftermath
had significant effects on the regulation and perception of the shadow banking sector. This is likely
to have caused structural breaks and would change the parameters underlying the financial sector.
Although variable and increasing, shadow banks’ balance sheets averaged about 50% of bank
balance sheets from 1990 to 2007 (Flows of Funds). The prior for the matching efficiency is chosen
such that the steady state credit intermediation by shadow banks is about 50%, see Table 2. For
the separation rate, I choose a value of 5% to correspond with the quarterly redemption rates
of mutual funds in the US (Investment Company Institute, 2014 [16]). The priors for household
bargaining power ωHH and matching elasticity ξ are relatively uninformative Beta distributions
centered around 0.5 and allowing for values in the open interval between 0 and 1. I choose a
prior mean for λSBt , the fraction of assets a shadow banker may divert, equal to the corresponding
5I will consider the case with repo creation by shadow banks. For an analysis without repo creation, see a previous
version of this paper at https://ideas.repec.org/p/hum/wpaper/sfb649dp2014-056.html
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Symbol Value Description Source
Households
β 0.99 Discount rate GK (2011)
h 0 / 0.815 Habit GK (2011)
χHH 3.409 Relative utility weight of labor GK (2011)
ϕ 0.276 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply GK (2011)
Banks
λ 0.381 Fraction of bank assets that can be diverted GK (2011)
ω 0.002 Proportional transfer to the incoming banks GK (2011)
θ 0.972 Survival rate of a banker GK (2011)
Goods Producers
α 0.33 Effective capital share GK (2011)
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate GK (2011)
Retail Firms
 4.167 Elasticity of substitution GK (2011)
γ 0.779 Probability of keeping prices fixed GK (2011)
γp 0.241 Price indexation GK (2011)
Government
G/Y 0.2 Steady state proportion of government expenditures GK (2011)
κpi 1.5 Inflation coefficient of Taylor rule GK (2011)
κy 0.125 Output gap coefficient of Taylor rule GK (2011)
ρi 0.8 Smoothing parameter of the Taylor rule GK (2011)
Shocks
ρa 0.95 Autocorrelation of technology shock GK (2011)
σa 0.01 Standard deviation of technology shock GK (2011)
σi 0.005 Standard deviation of interest rate shock GK (2011)
Table 1: Calibrated parameter Values
parameter for banks from GK11. The priors for all persistence parameters are Beta distributions
with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.2. The priors for the white noise processes on the
innovations are Inverse Gamma distributions with means taken from GK11 and standard deviations
of 0.05. The shock processes are a priori independent. I run 10 Monte Carlo Markov Chains with
100.000 draws each over the full sample period. Convergence is reached after about 50.000 draws
(see Figure 9 in Appendix A.2) and I therefore drop the first 50% of estimated values.
The posteriors of the shock processes are informative (see Appendix A.2). Persistence is rela-
tively high for all shock processes with the exception of capital quality and bank net wealth shocks.
The posterior mode for λSB is much higher than the prior mean and corresponding parameter
for banks. This means ceteris paribus that shadow banks are less able to leverage since they can
divert more funds than banks6. Matching elasticity ξ is relatively high, implying that ’unemployed’
deposits are relatively abundant. This is mirrored in the household bargaining power ωHH , which
has a relatively low posterior mode at 0.02.
3.2 Response to a monetary policy shock
Figure 2 shows impulse response functions for key variables after unexpected monetary policy
tightening for the case with only banks and the case with shadow banks present (as well as the 90%
highest posterior density intervals based on the Bayesian estimation).
6In steady state, shadow banks may still have higher leverage than banks because the marginal expected discounted
values of assets and net wealth will be higher than the corresponding values for banks.
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Prior Posterior
Symbol Name Type Mean Std. Dev. Mode Std. Dev.
Structural
s Matching efficiency Beta 3 1 4.6 0.06
ξ Matching elasticity Beta 0.5 0.2 0.87 0.08
ωHH Shadow Bank divertibility Beta 0.5 0.2 0.02 0.01
χSB Separation rate Beta 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.02
λSB Shadow Bank divertibility mean Beta 0.381 0.1 0.73 0.03
Persistences
ρA TFP Beta 0.5 0.2 0.78 0.05
ρξ Capital Quality Beta 0.5 0.2 0.04 0.03
ρg Government Spending Beta 0.5 0.2 0.75 0.06
ρi Monetary Policy Beta 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.06
ρNe Bank Net Wealth Beta 0.5 0.2 0.16 0.03
ρFS Fund Share Redemption Beta 0.5 0.2 0.76 0.05
ρλNe Bank divertible share Beta 0.5 0.2 0.61 0.28
ρλFS Shadow Bank divertible share Beta 0.5 0.2 0.76 0.06
ρIE Investment Efficiency Beta 0.5 0.2 0.63 0.08
Std dev.
eA TFP Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.009 0.001
eξ Capital Quality Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.010 0.001
eg Government Spending Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.008 0.001
ei Monetary Policy Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.003 0.001
eNe Bank Net Wealth Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.047 0.003
eFS Fund Share Redemption Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.076 0.012
eλNe Bank divertible share Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.004 0.001
eλFS Shadow Bank divertible share Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.163 0.002
eIE Investment Efficiency Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.05 0.009 0.001
Table 2: Priors and Posteriors of Estimated Parameters
First, consider the case with no shadow banks present in the economy (red, dashed line). After
an unexpected monetary tightening of about 33 basis points, interest rates on government bonds
increase. To encourage depositors to keep their savings with banks instead of shifting them into
government bonds, banks need to raise interest on deposits. At the same time, an increase in
interest rates reduces the net present value of future operations and therefore net worth of firms.
This also reduces the value of collateral necessary to finance capital acquisitions. Unable to post
collateral, the least productive firms leave the market, which decreases capital demand, reduces
investment and also the price of capital. This drop in the price for capital further decreases firms’
net worth, pushing up the external finance premium and decreasing capital demand even more.
In addition, higher deposit interest rates increase savings and reduce consumption. The drop in
demand reduces prices and makes goods production even less profitable, putting further downward
pressure on capital demand for production. A negative financial accelerator results, as in Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) [3].
With shadow banks present (blue, solid line) the initial reaction is the same. Deposit rates
rise and, to keep profit margins up, banks raise the borrowing rate. However, now the rise in
interest rates on government bonds, bank deposits and bank loans has another effect. Shadow
banks negotiate the fund rate over their expected profits and households’ alternative savings. Both
the borrowing rate and deposit rates rise, which increases the fund rate. Since the borrowing rate
increases more than the funds rate, the interest rate differential that shadow banks earn increases
and makes intermediation more profitable, raising fund advertisement expenditures. This increases
new fund share sales and allows the shadow banks to offer more credit. Since many previously
creditworthy borrowers were pushed out of the market, shadow bank loans now replace some of the
lost credit. This has a dampening effect on the fall in investment, which strongly reduces capital
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to Monetary Policy Tightening
decumulation to about half the case without shadow banks present.
The behavior of shadow bank lending following a monetary policy tightening is consistent with
empirical studies of the shadow banking system (see Figure 1 and Altunbas, Gambacrota and
Marques-Ibanez (2009) [1]; Den Haan and Sterk (2010) [13]; Igan et al. (2013) [15]). Igan et
al show that some shadow banks increase lending after monetary policy tightening, while banks
reduce lending. Den Haan and Sterk show that both mortgages and consumption credit increase
following an increase in the monetary policy rate. Finally, Altunbas et al show that European
banks with more securitization activities reduce their lending by less than non-securitizing banks
after monetary tightening. Given the European characteristic of universal banks that house both
banking and shadow banking activities within the same group structure, this finding is in line
with understanding securitizing banks to be less affected by monetary shocks because they house a
larger shadow banking entity within their group structure, which insulates group lending behavior
by increasing lending following monetary policy tightening.
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3.3 Shadow Bank Contributions to the Business Cycle
Shadow banks change the way shocks propagate through the economy. Comparing variance de-
compositions of the GK11 economy with and without shadow banks shows that certain shocks are
amplified while others are reduced, see Table 3. The contribution of technology shocks, both neu-
tral and investment-specific, increases because shadow banks behave comparably to banks when
real sector variables are affected. Shocks emanating from the banking sector are less pronounced,
because the shadow banking sector offsets those developments. Contribution of shadow bank re-
demption rate shocks increases because the shadow banking sector has a bigger share of aggregate
credit. Monetary policy shocks are an in-between case: their contribution to real variable variance
decreases, while it increases for financial variables.
Series \shock TFP Mon Pol Govt Inv Cap Quality Bank NW SB NW Bank leverage SB leverage
Output 17% / 21% 8% / 5% 0% / 0% 11% / 28% 16% / 14% 46% / 28% 2% / 3% 0% / 0% 0% / 0%
Hours 6% / 7% 5% / 5% 0% / 0% 3% / 7% 47% / 51% 38% / 31% 1% / 0% 0% / 0% 0% / 0%
Investment 15% / 23% 9% / 4% 1% / 1% 20% / 41% 5% / 10% 47% / 14% 2% / 7% 0% / 0% 0% / 0%
Consumption 12% / 15% 9% / 7% 0% / 0% 12% / 32% 6% / 3% 58% / 41% 3% / 2% 0% / 0% 0% / 0%
Borrowing rate 11% / 12% 5% / 4% 0% / 0% 3% / 5% 46% / 49% 34% / 28% 1% / 1% 0% / 0% 0% / 0%
Deposit rate 15% / 19% 16% / 15% 0% / 0% 28% / 46% 3% / 0% 36% / 14% 1% / 6% 1% / 1% 0% / 0%
Bank Leverage 17% / 20% 7% / 8% 0% / 0% 4% / 7% 41% / 44% 31% / 20% 1% / 1% 0% / 0% 0% / 0%
Inflation 13% / 13% 26% / 28% 0% / 0% 8% / 11% 31% / 34% 20% / 7% 0% / 6% 2% / 1% 0% / 0%
Bank Loans 11% / 14% 60% / 64% 0% / 0% 8% / 11% 1% / 1% 18% / 9% 1% / 1% 0% / 0% 0% / 0%
Table 3: Variance decomposition of key variables without / with shadow banking
Given the changed nature of shock propagation, it follows that macroeconomic fluctuations may
be attributed to different developments. To shed light on past business cycles, I perform a historical
shock decomposition of the dynamics of key variables. Parameters are fixed at the posterior mode
and the Kalman smoother is used to identify shock timelines that best explain the data. Figure
3 shows the HP-trend deviation of GDP, bank loans and shadow bank loans from Q1 1990 to Q4
2008.
Focusing on the lead up to the financial crisis, the model interprets GDP growth from 2004 to
2007 as having been caused by a mix of positive shocks to bank and shadow bank net wealth and
neutral technology shocks as well as unexpected contractionary monetary policy and investment
specific shocks. In contrast to some voices (e.g. Taylor 2007 [26]), the model does not interpret
monetary policy to have been artificially low and thereby contributing to the housing boom. The
positive financial shocks can be interpreted as the loosening of credit standards that lead to the
housing boom, as is evident from the decompositions of loans by banks and shadow banks. Policy
makers started to change gear in late 2007 when they started easing, which supported GDP but
was not sufficient to avert a crisis. Negative financial shocks in the form of equity withdrawals and
discontinuation of repo agreements led to a reduction of lending and the downturn.
In general, the insulation of the balance sheet channel from the lending channel can be seen in
the influence of monetary policy on bank and shadow bank lending: most of the time, monetary
policy affects the variables broadly in opposite directions. Focusing on only bank lending and the
balance sheet channel may therefore result in the appearance of large policy mistakes. However, the
effects of monetary policy decisions on shadow banks and the lending channel are likely to change
this assessment. Since the Federal Open Market Committee considers a number of developments
in real and financial sectors, the inclusion of the shadow banking sector is a convenient extension
that allows a more comprehensible assessment of policy makers’ decisions.
17
Figure 3: Historical Shock Decomposition of Key Variables, 1990:Q1 - 2008:Q4
3.4 Differentiating the Balance Sheet Channel from the Lending Channel
Monetary policy affects bank and shadow bank lending differently. The reason for this is that
different constraints bind their behavior. Banks concentrate on the spread that they can earn on
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lending. As long as a borrower is likely to be able to pay a high enough interest rate at a given
risk, a bank will be willing to extend credit. Banks can afford this focus on the interest rate spread
because they are not necessarily bound by available funds (Bennett, 2002, [2]). In the model,
this is reflected in the effective balance sheet composition of the bank, as in equation (8). The
amount of lending depends on the leverage variable and the net worth of the bank. The latter two
adjust endogenously to the productivity in the economy, which is captured by the firms’ ability
to borrow. This credit mechanism therefore corresponds to the balance sheet channel of monetary
policy transmission.
On the other hand, shadow banks are constrained in their lending by the amount of deposits they
are able to acquire. Because the deposit interest rate increases the outside option for households
in interest rate bargaining with shadow banks, households increase their allocation of savings in
fund shares, which increases shadow bank funding. Although this increases shadow banking costs,
their revenue in the form of the borrowing rate is also increasing. Reinforcing this effect, the last
term in equation (17) shows that the value of every established match increases in the arrival rate
of fund matches. Because a separation rate χSB < 1 implies that a shadow bank stands to gain
from already established funding matched today, front-loading on advertisement will result in the
amount of fund shares overshooting their equilibrium value (Pissarides, 2000 [23]). Since shadow
bank lending is dependent on funding, this mechanism should be more closely identified with the
lending channel.
In practice, the differentiation between the two channels based on entities is not so clear cut.
Many shadow banks are subsidiaries of banks and are sponsored or funded by the corporate parent.
If the shadow bank receives funding before being able to sell shares to savers, credit creation is
taking place on the balance sheets of the bank and shadow bank in step. Only after the sale of
fund shares and repayment of the parent by the subsidiary will the credit be solely attributable to
the shadow banking sector.
Some of the financial products banks offer to their customers are comparable to a lending channel
mechanism. Consider long-term savings deposits or any other product that is not immediately
withdrawable by the saver and does not constitute a means of payment in the economy. In this
case, credit creation by the bank backed by savings deposits can only take place after succesfully
matching a savings account with a lender. In this case, bank credit creation may be more comparable
to the lending channel and should be modeled with the proposed mechanism.
Similary, some authors argue that endogeneous credit creation is taking place inside the shadow
banking system as well (Pozsar, 2014 [24]). This activity is identified as repo creation and the
mechanism is modeled in Section 2.8, which is representative of the balance sheet mechanism
explained above. The difference between repo creation by shadow banks and credit creation by
banks is that although repo creation endogeneously varies with the productivity in the economy, it
is bound by the fund shares it has exchanged for deposits since ”demand deposits are special [...]
because of their unique role in forming the backbone of the payments system and facilitating the
payments of all entities lower in the system-hierarchy” (Pozsar, 2014 [24]). Repo creation therefore
still depends on the amount of shadow bank funding matched.
An unambiguous identification of the two mechanisms with respect to individual entities or
sectors is difficult to attain. A better classification of institutions and activities with regards to
their function should be possible in more detailed studies.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper I have introduced non-bank financial intermediaries into a monetary financial DSGE
model via the relatively parsimonious search and matching framework. Since banks create credit
endogenously, funding supply is not a constraint on bank lending. Instead, their choice of lending
depends on the productivity in the economy. Banks’ response to shocks therefore more readily
resembles the balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission. Shadow banks have to raise
funds in the form of deposits first to act as intermediaries. Their behavior is therefore dependent
on the supply of funding and corresponds more accurately to the lending channel.
Differentiating banks and shadow banks according to their lending and funding constraints
respectively results in impulse response functions suggested by empirical studies of the sector.
Following monetary policy tightening, banks will decrease the amount of loans, while shadow banks
will increase loans (Figure 1). As a consequence, shadow banks can significantly reduce the real
effects of monetary policy shocks. At the same time, they amplify the reaction of key variables to
real shocks.
A historical shock decomposition shows that easing of credit standards for banks and shadow
banks were important contributors to the run up to the financial crisis. Expansionary monetary
policy does not seem to have played a major role, mainly because credit developments by banks
and shadow banks are affected in different ways. Redemption of fund shares in shadow banks was
a key contributor to the sharp drop in GDP in 2008.
The modification of impulse response functions in the face of different financial intermediaries
suggests an impact on the welfare effects of business cycles in the tradition of Lucas (2003) [19]. The
recognition of additional effects shadow banks introduce may impact results on both the optimal
size of the financial sector as a whole, and the relative shares of its components.
Another important question is whether central bank policy reacts optimally to real and nominal
shocks if it does not take the presence of shadow banks into account. Monetary policy as modeled
by a Taylor rule may not anticipate dampened responses following the presence of shadow banks,
and may therefore not react optimally. The recognition of shadow bank lending or a modified Taylor
rule that includes data on money and credit as in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007) [5] may
generate further insights in another exploration.
In the model, shadow banks fund themselves through fund shares that are sold to households
only. In reality, shadow banks are often debtors to banks. Additionally, before the crisis mostly US
shadow banks contributed to the funding of mostly EU banks. These situations could be explored in
both a national and international setting to understand the funding shocks more thoroughly. These
analyses will also allow us to experiment with the re-regulation of the shadow banking sector.
In addition, household savings allocations are passively modeled in this version. The explicit
microfoundation of savings decisions, together with the introduction of uncertain returns from the
intermediary sector, will allow further realism and additional policy experiments.
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A Appendix
A.1 Interest Rate Bargaining
The marginal surplus shadow banks stand to gain from making an additional loan is the difference
between the value of an employed share V SB,e versus an unemployed share V SB,u, with
V SB,et = (Rkt −RSBt ) + βΛt,t+1[(1− χ)V SB,et+1 + χV SB,ut+1 ]
V SB,ut = −1 + βΛt,t+1[qtV SB,et+1 + (1− qt)V SB,ut+1 ].
If shadow banks find a fund share buyer, they earn the difference on the interest rates and
will keep this surplus if the match is not separated. If they do not find a match, they have to
advertise, incurring advertisement costs, which has a probability qt of finding a match next period.
In accordance with the free entry condition in the labor search literature, I assume that shadow
banks advertise until the value of an unemployed share is zero, V SB,u = 0. I can then express
βΛt,t+1V
SB,e
t+1 = 1/qt. Inserting this above, the value of an employed share under free entry is then
V SBt = (Rkt −RSBt ) + (1− χ)
1
qt
.
For a household the value of savings at shadow banks V HH,e versus savings at banks V HH,u is
V HH,et = R
SB
t + βΛt,t+1[(1− χ)V HH,et+1 + χV HH,ut+1 ]
V HH,ut = Rt + βΛt,t+1[ftV
HH,e
t+1 + (1− ft)V HH,ut+1 ],
where ft ≡ m(vt, But+1)/But+1 is the probability of an unemployed deposit being intermediated
through a shadow bank. The surplus from lending to a shadow bank is the difference they receive
in interest rates together with the value they have from keeping that savings relationship,
V HHt = R
SB
t −Rt + βΛt,t+1(1− χ− ft)V HHt+1 .
From the first-order condition for interest rate bargaining I know that
ωHH
V HHt
=
(1− ωHH)
V SBt
.
Solving this forward one period and inserting above, as well as inserting V SBt+1 , I get for the
households surplus
V HHt = R
SB
t −Rt + (1− χ− ft)βΛt,t+1V SBt+1
ωHH
1− ωHH .
= RSBt −Rt + (1− χ− ft)
1
qt+1
ωHH
(1− ωHH) .
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Inserting the surpluses for shadow banks and households into the first-order condition and
solving forward one period results in
ωHH{
(RSBt+1 −Rt+1) + (1− χ− ft+1) 1qt+1 ω
HH
1−ωHH
} = (1− ωHH){
(Rkt+1 −RSBt+1) + (1−χ)qt+1
} ,
which can be solved for the interest rate shadow banks have to pay on their fund shares
RSBt+1 = (1− ωHH)Rt+1 + ωHH {Rkt+1 + θt+1} .
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A.2 Bayesian Estimation
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